In Comparison: Hsün Tzu and Augustine of Hippo

Copyright 1990 by John R. Mabry

We would, perhaps, be hard put to find two less likely figures for comparison than Hsün Tzu and St. Augustine. They are, of course, from cultures totally alien to one another, at different times, and of considerable differences in philosophy. Yet each, independent of the other, taught an unpopular doctrine concerning the intrinsic nature of man as being evil. It is this seeming similarity and rash of differences with which this paper is concerned, and hopefully, we will show that even the similar teachings regarding human nature are, in fact, so dissimilar as to end any opinion of agreement.

Superficially, however, there is much in their distinct dramas from which we might draw many similarities. They were, for instance, both highly learned men, albeit they took different routes to their educations: Augustine was extensively schooled, while Hsün Tzu was largely self-taught. Both were figures of some degree of political prominence. As Bishop of Hippo, Augustine gained not insubstantial influence in regard to the emperor and the papacy. This, in fact, may be the sole reason for Augustine's ideas becoming accepted despite their heinous pessimism. Hsün Tzu, while not gaining anything near Augustine's position, did gain the ear of some in power, notably King Hsün at the court in Ch'i, though the post was short-lived and Hsün Tzu had little success in propagating his ideas.1 Both also engaged in heated literary debates with their philosophical opponents, the surviving texts providing some of the most exciting reading in the canons of each.

Superficiality aside, however, it is the opinion that human nature is intrinsically evil that suggests the comparison of these two worthy philosophers. Evil is not, for them, an aquired trait born of experience, but something present at birth. Hsün Tzu says, "The nature is that which is given by Heaven; you cannot learn it, you cannot acquire it by effort."2 For Hsün Tzu, goodness is cultivated via ritual principles, which, if a man lacks them, "his behavior will be chaotic, and if he does not understand them, he will be wild and irresponsible. In fact, therefore, man in the state in which he is born possesses this tendency toward chaos and irresponsibility."3 Augustine would agree that human nature is corrupt from birth, declaring although "we did not yet have individually created and apportioned forms in which to live as individuals" what did exist already was the "nature of the semen from which we were to be propagated." Elaine Pagels notes that it is Augustine's opinion that due to nature actually being inherited via the male, "every human being ever conceived through semen already is born contaminated with sin."4 Augustine went so far as to declare that newborn infants were so corrupt as to be the very limbs of Satan!5 Hsün Tzu says, "Hence, any man who follows his nature and indulges his emotions will inevitably become involved in wrangling and strife, will violate the forms and rules of society, and will end as a criminal,"6 a statement with which Augustine would no doubt whole-heartedly agree.

Both philosophers also agree that intervention is necessary to make anything useful out of Original Man. Goodness, for both men, is an aquired trait. Hsün Tzu writes, "a warped piece of wood must wait until it has been laid against the straightening board, steamed, and forced into shape before it can become straight, because by nature it is warped. Similarly, since man's nature is evil, he must wait for the ordering power of the sage kings and the transforming power of ritual principles; only then can he achieve order and conform to goodness."7 Augustine agrees, believing that mankind cannot be trusted to govern itself, because our very nature-indeed all of nature-has become corrupt.8 Pagels writes: "By insisting that humanity, ravaged by sin, now lies helplessly in need of outside intervention, Augustine's theory could not only validate secular power but justify as well the imposition of church authority-by force if necessary-as essential for human salvation."9

For Augustine, the intervention is the Church, who provides, in Chinese terms, sage rulers and ritual principles. For the Christian, this means baptism and indoctrination (In symbolic terms, the ruling Catholic hierarchy is seen as sort of sage-kings, or philosopher-kings, to use the Greek idea, though very rarely has the reality lived up to the expression). Passion, especially, for both men was a dead giveaway concerning man's intrinsic nature and continued corruption. For Augustine, sexual desire is the proof of universal original sin,10 to which Hsün Tzu might have responded with an emphatic "Man's emotions, man's emotions-they are very unlovely things indeed!"11

Hsün Tzu resonates with even some of Augustine's more Neo-Platonic leanings. For instance, when Hsün Tzu writes "the mind gives meaning to impressions. It gives meaning to impressions, and only then, by means of the ear, can sound be known; by means of the eye, can forms be known.... When the five senses note something but cannot classify it, and the mind tries to identify it but fails to give it meaning, then one can only say that there is no knowledge."12 While this is a long way from Plato's world of forms, or Augustine's parallel, the Mind of God,13 we can see the spark of parallel thinking. Hsün Tzu is saying that unless there is a corresponding archetype or idea in one's pre-existing mental schema, it is impossible to identify or classify any incoming data from the senses.

However much sympathy it might seem that there is between these thinkers, however, they are also in many ways polar opposites. Hsün Tzu is not nearly so pessimistic regarding human nature. Yes, it is evil, but as Fung Yu-Lan points out, "man at the same time possesses intelligence, and that this intelligence makes it possible for him to become good."14 Indeed, almost like a mantra, the text of Hsün Tzu's book repeats "Man's nature is evil; goodness is the result of conscious activity."15 H.H. Dubs, in his Hsüntze, the Moulder of Ancient Confucianism, almost draws Augustine into the discussion by mentioning his Ideological heir, John Calvin, when he writes, "With Hsün Tzu this doctrine did not mean that human nature was totally depraved and without any hope, as in the teaching of Calvin, but rather just the opposite; because human nature tended to evil, each man must all the more work to develop his own nature towards the right. Human nature merely tends to evil; it has an infinite capacity for development in the direction of good as well."16

The result of this thinking is that anyone who wills it can cultivate the good in him/herself. Even the most common of persons can become a sage.17 As Hsün Tzu himself writes, "if the man in the street applies himself to training and study, concentrates his mind and will, and considers and examines things carefully, continuing his efforts over a long period of time and accumulating good acts without stop, then he can achieve a godlike understanding and form a triad with Heaven and earth. The sage is a man who has arrived where he has through the accumulation of good acts."18 So, by this philosophy, anyone has it in their power to be perfect and virtuous. Dubs makes the point that this doctrine is "the nearest that Confucianism came to the Christian teaching of the infinite worth of every individual."19 I can only guess that Mr. Dubs has not been reading Augustine, for the good Saint's thoughts on this matter are as diametrically opposed as is humanly possible.

Augustine believed that God arbitrarily divides mankind into the elect and the reprobate. This is fair since, because human nature is evil, we are all wicked anyway and deserving of damnation. So if God chooses to spare some, it is the result of his infinite mercy, and none have any right to complain.20 As Bertrand Russell puts it, "the elect go to heaven because God chooses to make them the objects of His mercy: they are virtuous because they are elect, not elect because they are virtuous."21 For Augustine, mankind has no power to make himself virtuous. He says, "the rational creature...has been so made that it cannot itself be the good by which it is made happy."22 Augustine would not have approved of Hsün Tzu's view at all, nor did he approve when a young monk named Pelagius challenged him that his doctrine was too severe. Pelagius thought that men still had free will and the power to live without sin; unlikely but possible (with which Hsün Tzu also would have concurred). For his pains, Pelagius was excommunicated, and the Church swung towards Augustine's position.23

Another great difference between our thinkers is their cosmology. Augustine's God was personal, and quite anthropomorphic, while Hsün Tzu's was impersonal, the Tao, the Way of Heaven, more of a principle than a person. In his estimation, "The Universe was righteous in its very constitution, and needed not God or spiritual beings to insure the supremacy of good over evil."24 Where Augustine is totally dependant on outside divine agency, since no human being can do good without grace-"a grace which the Almighty deliberately withholds from the majority of His creatures."25 Hsün Tzu is equally independent, feeling that any attempts to venture beyond the human, and knowable realm are pointless and futile.26 Help, for Hsün Tzu, might be necessary, but is obtainable from human sources. As he says, "since man's nature is evil, it must wait for the instructions of a teacher before it can become upright, and for the guidance of ritual principles before it can become orderly."27 Yu-Lan points out that Mencius, unlike his rival, did seek supernatural intervention, saying that "in order to become a sage, one must 'know Heaven.' But Hsün Tzu maintains, on the contrary: 'it is only the sage who does not seek to know Heaven'."28 (emphasis mine)

Hsün Tzu laments that the sorry state of mankind is owing to the absence of the sage-king. For "were there to be such a sage-king, he would use his political authority to unify the minds of the people, and lead them to the true way of life in which there is not place or need for disputation and argument."29 This is not necessarily so, as Augustine's example amply points out. Until the emperor Constantine converted to Christianity, Rome was a pagan state and Christians lived in fear of their lives. Yet, when the state itself became Christian, suddenly politics was subserviant to doctrine, and the West saw the rise of great political power in the Church. Suddenly, the sages-or priest-kings-were in power, and, like their pagan counterparts before them, they used their power in despicable ways to enforce the "unity of the minds of the people," with all the barbarity of the heathen. (One is inclined to believe that Hsün Tzu's sage-king exists only in Plato's world of forms.)

Man's place in the universe is also a point of contention. The Vatican just recently pardoned Galileo for his heretical doctrines about the Earth not being the center of the universe. This anthropocentrism is at the heart of nearly all Western philosophy and theology. Such hubris is not, however, so widely accepted in the East. Hsün Tzu himself says "The ten thousand beings are only one corner of the Way. One species of being is only one corner of the ten thousand beings. The stupid man is only one corner of one species. He himself believes that he understands the Way, though of course he does not."30 Such wisdom seems lost on the West, as often the most obvious is. Philosopher R.A. Marus comments on Augustine's attitude toward nature when he writes, "The world of nature was not in itself an object of particular interest in Augustine."31 In fact, Michael Planyi has written that Augustine, "destroyed interest in science all over Europe for a thousand years" because for him science "contributed nothing to the pursuit of salvation."32 Such doctrines of Augustine would, quickly and pervasively sway all of Europe, and Western civilization to his peculiar brand of pessimism, so unlike the surprisingly hopeful stance of Hsün Tzu.

Thus, the result of closer comparison reveals more striking differences than the initially apparent similarities suggest. And, in retrospect, it is perhaps unfortunate that the fortunes of these two thinkers were not reversed. For while Augustine went on to become the favored interpreter of St. Paul, and thus won not only sainthood, but academic immortality, Hsün Tzu was not so fortunate. Mencius won out as the prime interpreter of Confucious, and Hsün Tzu's, just like Pelagius, Julian and many other philosophical opponents of Augustine, were condemned, and though not forgotten, certainly not held in the same degree of authority.

Endnotes

1 Watson, Burton, trans. Hsün Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 2.

2 Ibid., p. 158.

3 Ibid., p. 162.

4 Pagels, Elaine Adam, Eve, and the Serpent (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 109.

5 Russell, Bertrand, quoting Augustine A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), p. 365.

6 Watson, p. 157.

7 Ibid., p. 164.

8 Pagels, p.145.

9 Ibid., p. 124-5.

10 Ibid., p. xviii.

11 Watson, p. 168.

12 Yu-Lan, Fung A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 151.

13 Copleston, Frederick, S.J. A History of Philosophy, Volume II (New York: Image, 1962), p. 73..

14 Yu-Lan, p. 145.

15 Watson, p. 157.

16 Dubs, H.H. Hsüntze: The Moulder of Ancient Confucianism (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1927), p. 77.

17 Yu-Lan, p. 145.

18 Watson, p. 167.

19 Dubs, p. 84.

20 Russell, p. 362.

21 Ibid., p. 274.

22 Copleston, p. 81.

23 Russell, Bertrand; Al Seckel, ed. On God and Religion (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1986), p. 243.

24 Dubs, p. 56.

25 Azkoul, Michael The Influence of Augustine of Hippo on the Orthodox Church (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), p. 207.

26 Watson, p. 8.

27 Ibid., p. 158.

28 Yu-Lan, p. 144.

29 Ibid., p. 153.

30 Watson, p. 87.

31 Fox, Matthew Original Blessing (Santa Fe: Bear & Co., 1983), p. 75.

32 Ibid., p. 11.